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ABSTRACT
I find evidence to support the negative impact of growth options on corporate social
responsibility (CSR). I propose that attention-constrained managers reduce corporate goodness
to focus on growth opportunities. The effect is more pronounced for well-governed firms, for
financially-constrained firms, and for capital-intensive social dimensions. Firms reduce their
research and development (R&D) and capital expenditures, and experience lower annual
buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) subsequent to significant increases in their social
performance. I also report value implications of CSR investments. The empirical evidence
suggests that managerial choices to divert attention from growth projects toward CSR hurt
shareholders.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, I examine whether cross-firm variations in corporate social responsibility
(CSR) can be explained by growth options, assuming that managers have limited attention.
Managers are naturally drawn to CSR for personal gains —an agency tendency known as
“doing good with other people’s money” (Cheng, Hong, and Shue, 2013). If the firms have a
plethora of growth opportunities, the managers are incentivized to focus on these projects
and divert their attention away from less profitable investments, including unproductive CSR.
The inverse relation between growth options and CSR hinges on the inevitable financial and
attention constraints that firms face. Loosely speaking, CSR imposes an opportunity cost for
firms with ample good growth options because the managers can alternatively focus their
attention and financial resources on these projects.
The agency view in corporate finance has long depicted managers as self-interested individ-
uals who deviate from the shareholder maximization objective for personal gains. In the realm
of CSR, agency issues may manifest in different forms. For example, managers may focus
on objectives which enhance stakeholders’ benefits, such as installing environmental-friendly
production facilities, donating to charitable organizations, hiring less qualified employees
to promote diversity and offering extensive employee benefits. More troubling, managers
may divert their attention away from important corporate matters and toward CSR. This
attention shift behavior is costly to shareholders because the managers can exert their full
effort and attention on shareholder-maximizing projects instead.
By definition, the agency theory states that managers are tempted to pursue activities
1
contradicting the shareholder maximization objective for their personal gains. On the sur-
face, it is not obvious what self-interested reasons motivate managers to engage in these
stakeholder-friendly CSR activities. At the same time, the media has increasingly promoted
stories in which the “give and take” mentality is considered the driver of success behind
many corporations. For instance, socially responsible firms may be able to gain more enthusi-
astic workers, more loyal customers, or more reliable suppliers which are valuable to firms.
These effects are consistent with the “doing well by doing good” view that was previously
documented (Deng, Kang, and Low (2013), Flammer (2015) and Kru¨ger (2015)). However, it
is questionable whether these “halo effects” that CSR generates dominate the opportunity
costs imposed on firms when managers choose to focus on CSR rather than other projects.
There are several feasible arguments for the agency theory regarding CSR. One viable
explanation is that CSR is an outlet for altruistic managers to improve stakeholders’ welfare
without having to make much personal sacrifice. In other words, managers are tempted
to use corporate resources rather than personal wealth for their charity-oriented purposes.
Ultimately, the cost of lower firm value is mostly incurred by the firm’s shareholders. More
importantly, this agency behavior is most likely shielded from subsequent punishments. For
instance, managers are likely to be replaced following their value-destroying mergers (Lehn
and Zhao, 2006) whereas socially responsible managers are less subject to CEO turnover. In
addition, praise from the media, support from environmental groups, and advocacy from
consumers are another source of personal benefits which draw managers’ attention to CSR
and away from contemporary corporate issues.
In this paper, I propose that managers can overcome the temptation to shift their attention
to CSR if the firms have really good growth opportunities. The corresponding compensation
from dedicating to growth projects will rise above that of a managerial decision to be socially
responsible. A firm’s CSR is, hence, an equilibrium resulting from trading off the manager’s
personal benefits of investing in CSR and the opportunity costs of forgone compensation from
growth options. The more profitable the projects, the less likely the managers will attend
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to CSR. In this case, firm growth options act as a self-driven mechanism which attenuates
the agency problem of attention shift. Conversely, if there are not many good growth oppor-
tunities, it will be more difficult for managers to resist the temptation of engaging in CSR
projects. Overall, I expect CSR to be inversely related to growth options.
Behavioral finance research has demonstrated that managers sometimes make suboptimal
corporate decisions proceeding from their behavioral biases.1 For example, managers may
overestimate the potential personal gains from investing in CSR and underestimate the
expected compensation from focusing on growth opportunities instead. In these scenarios,
compensation schemes designed to align managers’ interests with those of shareholders
typically fail to work. Thus, competent boards play a critical role in holding managers
accountable. For instance, the board may advise against CSR if growth opportunities exist.
However, if there are not many growth options, the board is less likely to intervene with the
manager’s decision because it is better than him pursuing negative net present value (NPV)
projects. Taken together, effective governance mechanisms add another layer of protection
against agency issues by ensuring that managers act in the best interests of shareholders.
By and large, I expect the growth options-CSR relation to be stronger among well-governed
firms.
In practice, numerous governance mechanisms have been proposed and adopted in order to
alleviate agency problems. Apart from internal governance mechanisms such as independent
boards of directors and performance-contingent compensation schemes, several external mech-
anisms are discussed such as regulatory compliance, takeover threats, analysts, and media
pressure. Using analysts following as a proxy for external governance, I show that the growth
options-CSR relation is responsive to not only internal corporate governance but also external
corporate governance. In addition, I predict a stronger effect for financially-constrained
firms and for capital-intensive CSR areas. If firms are financially-constrained, their boards
will likely exert monitoring efforts to ensure that the firms’ resources are well-managed and
1Cronqvist and Yu (2017) document managers’ tendency to have concerns for diversity and on average
invest more in CSR if they have daughters.
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allocated to the most profitable investments. Meanwhile, boards of non-constrained firms
are more accepting of unproductive CSR as long as they are positive NPV. Likewise, boards
are more resistant to CSR investments that require significant capital, and less opposing to
non-capital-intensive CSR projects.
In my empirical analysis, I employ social ratings retrieved from the MSCI (formerly KLD)
database over the period from 1995 to 2013. Using models with firm and year fixed-effects,
I show that CSR is negatively related to growth options, and the effect is stronger for
well-governed firms. The empirical evidence lends credence to my story that firm growth
options help altruistic managers to overcome the temptation to shift their attention toward
CSR. I also examine the relationship for firms with strong internal and external corporate
governance mechanisms. Using three different measures of internal corporate governance,
and the number of analysts following as an external governance mechanism, I show that
the growth-CSR inverse relationship is more pronounced among well-governed firms, among
capital-constrained firms and among capital-intensive social areas. In a non-regression setting,
I examine the changes in R&D and capital expenditure as well as buy-and-hold abnormal
returns (BHAR) for a group of firms experiencing significant changes in their corporate
goodness. I find that increases in CSR are associated with reductions in R&D, capital
expenditure, and BHAR.
Using Tobin’s Q as a performance metric, I further examine the effects on firm value
subsequent to firm engagements in CSR. Consistently, I find supporting evidence for the
negative impact of CSR on firm value for growth firms across all different model specifications.
Interestingly, I also find the CSR-firm value negative relationship among well-governed firms
although it first appears counter-intuitive that well-governed firms make ineffective CSR
investments. One feasible explanation is that investors infer firms’ active engagements in
CSR as an indicator of not having growth opportunities. In other words, value reduction
is a consequence of investors updating beliefs about the state of firm growth opportunities.
I predict that firm devaluation is more prevalent among less competitive industries. In
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competitive industries, managers may be compelled to improve their social performance to
hedge against criticism from the media and environmental groups, or gain favor from workers,
customers, prosecutors and compete with their industry socially-responsible peers.2 Thus, it
is more difficult for investors to infer information about firm growth options via CSR when
CSR is likely to be a manifestation of industry peer pressure.
I proceed to investigate the CSR-firm value relationship in a triple-interaction setting.
I propose two concurrent effects following firm investments in CSR. First, I document the
CSR-firm value negative relationship for firms with growth options. This result is consistent
with what was previously found in the double-interaction analysis. This first layer of firm de-
valuation reflects the opportunity costs of CSR for growth firms because they can alternatively
focus on growth projects. Second, I observe a stronger CSR-firm devaluation among growth
firms if these firms are well-governed. Because well-governed firms are more inclined to make
shareholder-optimizing decisions, investors are more convinced that these socially-conscious
firms lack good growth options. Collectively, the results suggest that investors learn about
firm growth options upon observing firm investing in CSR.
This paper contributes to the growing literature of CSR and valuation, which is dominated
by the two main theories. The classical view considers CSR as an agency cost and a deviation
from the shareholder maximization objective. Viewing CSR as a waste of corporate resources,
the agency theory predicts minimal CSR investments for pure profit-maximizers. On the
other side of the spectrum, the stakeholder maximization view, often referred to as “doing
well by doing good”, suggests that corporate goodness to all stakeholders may generate
positive effects which are incorporated in firm value. For example, a firm may gain more
sales from customers or receive extended credits from suppliers as a consequence of being
socially responsible. On average, the stakeholder maximization view predicts high CSR across
all firms. In practice, there are substantial variations in CSR across firms, suggesting that
both of the theories are incomplete pictures of firms’ motives to invest in CSR. Empirically,
2Hong and Liskovich (2015) document that socially responsible firms pay $2 million less in fines.
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there is little evidence for a direct relationship between CSR and firm value. Rather, the
relationship is observed through indirect channels (Servaes and Tamayo, 2013).
One way to empirically test the agency theory of CSR is to study whether well-governed
firms, which supposedly suffer less from agency problems, are more socially responsible.
However, prior empirical research is mixed about the link between corporate governance and
social performance. Some papers show that well-governed firms tend to invest less on CSR
and exhibit lower social ratings (Cheng, Hong, and Shue (2013), Di Giuli and Kostovetsky
(2014)). However, other studies suggest the contradicting results that well-governed firms
are more likely to engage in CSR (Ferrell, Liang, and Renneboog (2016), Jo and Harjoto
(2011)). Meanwhile, other papers supporting the stakeholder view indicate that there are
many factors, rather than governance, which may affect firm choices of CSR. Among many
previously discussed measurable benefits to socially responsible firms are cheaper equity
financing (El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, and Mishra, 2011), lower loan spreads and longer
maturities (Goss and Roberts, 2011), better merger outcomes (Deng, Kang, and Low, 2013),
and more optimistic analyst recommendations (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2015).
In summary, the debate about the relationship between governance and CSR is incon-
clusive because of different sample periods, research designs and statistical methodologies.
Although it is unclear whether well-governed firms are more or less socially responsible,
large variations in CSR within the well-governed firm group suggest that governance does
not fully account for CSR. In this paper, I attempt to explain the variations in CSR by
growth options. In particular, I find that firms with good growth opportunities exhibit lower
social performance and the inverse relationship is more pronounced among well-governed firms.
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CHAPTER 2
MODEL
Consider a firm that has CSR R and firm valuation V . The manager and shareholders
have Cobb-Douglas utility given by
Um(R, V ) = R
αV β
Us(R, V ) = R
αV λ
(2.1)
(2.2)
where α, β, λ all lie in the unit interval (0,1). Assume that the utility functions of the
manager and the shareholders have the same sensitivity to a change in R —that is, the utility
elasticity of CSR is α for both the manager and the shareholders. In addition, I assume that
shareholders have higher utility elasticity of firm value than managers or λ > β.
The manager can decide where he pays his attention A: either focus on growth projects
that yield V , or invest in CSR that yields R. Mathematically, his attention constraint is
given by:
ACSR + AGrowth = A (2.3)
Assume that attention generates CSR (R) and value (V ) via the following production
functions: R = (ACSR)
φ
V = (AGrowth)
θ
(2.4)
(2.5)
for some φ and θ in the unit interval. Note that θ is a proxy for growth options.
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Assume that the manager maximizes the utility function given by
U(R, V ) = (1− ω)Um(R, V ) + ωUs(R, V ) (2.6)
where ω is a measure of corporate governance, and ω ∈ [0, 1]. A high ω indicates that the firm
is well-governed, and vice versa. A high ω also suggests that the manager makes decisions
that benefit shareholders.
The manager maximizes a linear combination of his personal benefits and shareholders’
benefits from investing in projects and CSR, subject to his attention constraint A. The linear
combination is determined by the governance factor (ω), which dictates the degree to which
the manager adheres to the shareholder maximization goal. More specifically, the manager’s
optimization problem is given by:
maximize U(R, V ) = (1− ω)Um(R, V ) + ωUs(R, V )
subject to ACSR + AGrowth = A
The model predicts that the more growth options the firm has, the less corporate goodness,
or ∂R
∂θ
< 0. If the firm has many growth opportunities, the potential benefits from focusing
on the projects exceed those generated from CSR investments.
Another implication of the model is that the manager is more sensitive to growth options
if the firm is well-governed: ∂
2R
∂θ∂ω
> 0. To see why, consider two extreme cases: ω = 0 and
ω = 1. When ω = 0 (the firm is very poorly-governed), the manager can easily focus on
maximizing his own benefits. When ω = 1 (the firm is very well-governed), the manager
is forced to serve the shareholders’ benefits. The magnitude of the sensitivity of corporate
goodness to growth options is larger in the well-governed case (ω = 1) because the utility
function governing the manager’s decisions in the well-governed case is the shareholders’
function Us(R, V ), and shareholders appreciate firm value (V generated from growth projects)
more than the manager. I provide mathematical proofs for interested readers in Appendix B.
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I summarize the two propositions as follows:
Proposition 1. There is a negative relationship between firm growth options and corporate
goodness (∂R
∂θ
< 0).
Proposition 2. The manager has higher propensity to decrease corporate goodness to
focus on growth options if the firm is well-governed ( ∂
2R
∂θ∂ω
> 0).
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CHAPTER 3
DATA
Using the model as my general guidance, I proceed to conduct empirical analysis. I
employ the MSCI environmental, social, and governance (ESG) social ratings (formerly
Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini- KLD) database to construct measures of social performance
for the period from 1995 to 2013. I choose to start the data sample from 1995 because the
data on social ratings is incomplete for the period prior to 1995. Over the years, the MSCI
database has expanded its coverage substantially. For example, between 1991 and 2000,
the MSCI (KLD) database covered the S&P 500 and the Domini 400 Social Index. The
Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 were added to the database in 2001 and 2003, respectively.
The MSCI ESG database provides the ratings on corporate social performance in thirteen
dimensions: community, diversity, employee’s relations, environment, human rights, product,
alcohol, gambling, firearms, military, nuclear, tobacco, and corporate governance. I exclude
several categories in my analyses because they are only relevant to certain industries and not
applicable to all firms. Specifically, I include the six dimensions which are frequently used in
previous studies: community, diversity, employee’s relations, environment, human rights, and
product.
Each year, I compute a composite score for each firm by taking the average of all six
component scores, each of which is computed by adding strength points and subtracting
concern points. More specifically, the composite variable csr is calculated as
csrit =
∑
(strengths− concerns)it
n
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where i is a CSR component score, t is the year, and n is the number of components included
in the composite score. For the years in which the human right scores are not available, I
compute the average for the other five component scores. Following Servaes and Tamayo
(2013), I also compute a conservative composite score csr2 representing the overall performance
in five areas: community, diversity, employee’s relations, environment, and human rights.
The measure csr2 is similarly calculated as csr1 except that I do not include product quality
in the variable. Excluding product quality from the composite score is consistent with the
notion that product quality does not necessarily belong to the spectrum of CSR. The product
category reflects firm performance in several aspects such as product quality, product safety
and innovative features. Thus, firms manufacturing or selling products of higher caliber
receive higher social ratings on the product dimension and are considered to be more socially
responsible as a consequence. In robustness tests, I use this conservative measure to ensure
that the results are robust to this variable measurement.
I notice the expansive coverage of the MSCI database over time, not just in the number of
firms, but also in the number of strengths and concerns in each dimension. Specifically, the
database has become more extensive and detailed in their rating criteria and construction
of the “total” score given to each CSR dimension. For instance, in 1991, the community
category included only four sub-dimensions of strengths and the number of sub-dimensions
increased to seven in 2013. Therefore, a time-series analysis is inappropriate when I use
the composite CSR score without adjusting for the time trend. In order to overcome this
issue, I construct a trend-adjusted score to take into account the fact that the data set has
dramatically evolved over the years. More specifically, I calculate an adjusted composite
CSR score (adj csr) as the average of the adjusted component scores, which are computed by
adding pre-scaled strength points and subtracting pre-scaled concern points. Mathematically,
adj csrit =
∑
(adj componentit)
n
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where
adj componentit =
strengthsit
max(strengthst)
− concernsit
max(concernst)
The valuation implication analyses use Tobin’s Q, a widely used proxy for firm value.
Tobin’s Q is calculated as (book value of assets + market value of equity - book value of equity
deferred taxes investment tax credit + redemption value of preferred stock)/book value of
assets. Alternatively, I use industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q (adj q), which is defined as firm
Tobin’s Q divided by the industry median Tobin’s Q based on the Fama-French 49 industry
classifications. The accounting data used to compute Tobin’s Q comes from Compustat, which
can be accessed through Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). In robustness tests, I use
return on assets (roa) in place of Tobin’s Q. Even though ROA is widely used as a measure
of profitability and operating performance, I use Tobin’s Q as the main measure because
Tobin’s Q reflects the market value which is driven by expectations of future long-term cash
flows whereas ROA is a measure constructed from book value accounting data.
There are a couple of measures of growth options adopted in the literature such as the
ratio of capital expenditure to fixed assets and growth in capital investments (Anderson
and Garcia-Feijo´o (2006), Cao, Simin, and Zhao (2006), Trigeorgis and Lambertides (2014)).
Following previous studies, I adopt two measures of growth options (capg1 and capg2) which
can be calculated using firm financial data. More specifically, capg1 is defined as capital
expenditure divided by fixed assets and capg2 is measured as the annual change in capital
expenditure scaled by the previous year’s total asset. Trigeorgis and Lambertides (2014) argue
that capital expenditure divided by fixed assets (capg1) is a more direct way of capturing
growth options, rather than indirectly incorporating market reactions as some other measures
such as M/B and Tobin’s Q.
I adopt several measures of corporate governance. For internal mechanisms, I use three
measures including the MSCI corporate governance (cg), the governance index (G− index)
and the entrenchment index (E − index). The MSCI corporate governance ratings are based
on the assessment of firm performance on the following areas: compensation, ownership
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structure, accounting transparency, political accountability, public policy, controversial in-
vestments and business ethics. The G- index data is collected from the website of Professor
Andrew Metrick (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003). The entrenchment E-index is from the
website of Professor Lucian Bebchuk (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2008). I multiply the
G-index and E-index with (-1) so that higher scores indicate more effective governance. By
this construction, all regression results yield the same sign effect (either positive or negative)
on the variables of interest, regardless of the metrics or proxies used. The data on G-index
and E-index is available from 1995 to 2006 with biennial frequency of data points, thus I
extrapolated data points for missing years between 1995 and 2006 using linear functions.
For external corporate governance, I use the natural logarithm of the number of analysts
following.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the sample. The sample consists of 9,169 firms
with 40,110 firm-year observations. The average composite score ranges from (-1.6) to 3
with an average of 0.012. When adjusted for additional coverage of more sub-dimensions
over time, the data range shrinks (between -0.653 and 0.675) and the average (the average
trend-adjusted CSR score) is negative (-0.023).
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CHAPTER 4
DETERMINANTS OF CSR
In section 2, I present a model which predicts a negative relation between growth options
and CSR, assuming that the manager has attention limits. In this section, I proceed to
formulate a testable prediction to shed light on the relation empirically. The prediction is
summarized as follows:
Prediction 1. CSR and growth options are negatively correlated and the effect is stronger
for well-governed firms.
I estimate regressions of CSR as a function of growth for various levels of governance.
Specifically, my model is as follows:
csr = β0 + β1 ∗ growth+ 
I estimate the model for terciles of firms sorted based on their governance indexes. I report
the results in Table 2. The empirical evidence confirms my prediction —that is, there is a
negative relationship between growth opportunities and CSR. The effect is strongest among
well-governed firms. The coefficient decreases monotonically as firm governance becomes less
effective.
Alternatively, I estimate panel regressions of CSR as a function of growth and governance
and an interaction term between the two variables:
csr = β0 + β1 ∗ growth+ β2 ∗ governance+ β3 ∗ growth ∗ governance+ 
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Methodologically, I estimate the model using firm and year fixed effects to control for
unobserved factors. Because one firm can be estimated multiple times in each model, I
cluster the standard errors at the firm level to control for the lack of independence across
observations. All standard errors are robust to hetero-skedasticity (White, 1980). I report
the results in Table 3.
My analyses rely on the MSCI governance score being a good measure of governance.
Thus, I also conduct tests using alternative measures of corporate governance, including the
G-index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003) and the E-index (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell,
2008) for robustness check. In Table 3, I report the main results using all three different
measures of internal corporate governance: the MSCI CG score, the GIM G-index (Gompers,
Ishii, and Metrick, 2003), and the BCF E-index (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2008). The
tests yield qualitatively similar results and statistical significance levels of coefficients. For
each governance measure included in Table 3, I report two specifications: one using composite
CSR score and one using the trend-adjusted CSR score. All models use firm and year fixed
effects to control for time-invariant unobservable firm characteristics. In four out of six
models (models 1-4), I find that corporate governance is positively correlated with firm social
performance. The coefficients on the interaction term between growth options and corporate
governance are consistently negative and statistically significant for all six models regardless
of whether the models use the unadjusted or adjusted CSR scores. Overall, these findings are
supportive of the hypothesis that there is a negative relation between growth options and
CSR and the effects are stronger for well-governed firms.
I further investigate the relationship for firms with different levels of external pressure.
I use the natural logarithm of the number of analysts following as a proxy for external
governance and report the results in Table 4. The coefficient on the interaction term is
negative and significant for the group of firms which are in the top tercile of analysts following.
These firms are expected to undergo the highest external pressure from analysts, assuming that
the more analysts following, the more the firms are pressured to conform to certain behaviors.
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The coefficient reduces in economic magnitude and becomes statistically insignificant for
firms in the middle and bottom terciles. I find qualitatively similar results using E-index in
the place of the MSCI governance index. These results provide supporting evidence for a
stronger inverse relationship between growth and CSR amongst well-governed firms.
I also hypothesize that the CSR-growth relationship is more pronounced for financially-
constrained firms. I use the Kaplan-Zingales score (Kaplan and Zingales, 1995) as a measure
of how constrained a firm financially is. I sort firms based on their previous year’s financial
constraint Kaplan-Zingales scores into tercile. Firms in the top tercile are considered
constrained firms, and those in the middle and bottom terciles are coded as non-constrained
firms (or less constrained firms). I report the results in Table 5. I find that the coefficient on
the interaction term between growth and governance is stronger for constrained firms. The
evidence suggests that the growth-CSR inverse relationship for well-governed firms is more
pronounced if the firms are financially constrained. The coefficient is smaller in magnitude
and becomes insignificant for non-constrained firms, indicating that if firms can borrow to
finance all projects, CSR is less likely to be affected by the number and profitability of
growth projects. Taken together, these results suggest that financial constraint is one channel
whereby growth opportunities undercut CSR.
In a similar vein, I examine the growth-CSR relationship by investigating whether the
project costs have an impact on managerial decision to invest in a certain CSR project.
Although the MSCI (KLD) database does not provide the monetary costs, it is fair to assume
that the costs of implementing CSR projects vary substantially. For example, I expect that the
financial costs of adhering to environmental regulations and promoting green energy facilities
are higher than those of promoting workforce diversity and human rights. I report the results
in Table 6. The empirical results are consistent with my argument for a stronger growth-CSR
inverse relationship among capital-intensive CSR areas. Specifically, the coefficient on the
interaction term between governance and growth is statistically significant and economically
large for the environment component.
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CHAPTER 5
VALUE IMPLICATIONS OF CSR
5.1 Growth firms
In previous sections, I establish an inverse relationship between growth opportunities
and CSR. If profitable projects exist, managers are more likely to choose to focus on these
projects instead of diverting their away towards CSR. In this section, I analyze the value
implications of investing in CSR. I expect that shareholders suffer from managerial choice to
forgo good projects to attend to CSR. I formally outline a testable hypothesis as follows:
Prediction 2. Firm value is negatively correlated with CSR for growth firms.
Methodologically, I estimate the following model:
q = β0 + β1 ∗ growth+ β2 ∗ csr + β3 ∗ csr ∗ growth+ 
Using fixed effects, I indeed find evidence that there is a negative relation between CSR and
firm value for firms with growth options. The results are robust to using alternative measures,
such as industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q and trend-adjusted CSR score. The coefficients on the
interaction terms between growth and CSR are negative and significant across all different
specification models. I report the results in Table 7. The empirical results suggest that CSR
imposes an opportunity cost for firms with growth options, and that cost is incorporated
into firm value.1 Specifically, firm value is lower for firms with growth options but choose to
1Our results are robust to using an alternative proxy for growth options and to using roa in place of
Tobin’s q. The results are represented in Appendix C
17
attend to CSR.
5.2 Well-governed firms
In this section, I seek to understand the value implication of investing in CSR when
well-governed choose to engage in CSR. I estimate the following model:
q = β0 + β1 ∗ governance+ β2 ∗ csr + β3 ∗ csr ∗ goverance+ 
I report the results in Table 8. The coefficients on the interaction terms persist throughout
all model specifications. It first appears counter-intuitive that well-governed firms make
less productive CSR investments. One possible explanation for the negative impact on
valuation when well-governed firms choose to invest in CSR is that lower q is driven by lower
market valuation of future cash flows perceived by investors. I propose that part of the
investor population learns about growth options via CSR. Upon observing well-governed
firms investing in CSR, investors infer that firms do not have many growth projects and lower
their valuation sequentially.
I predict that the effect is more pronounced for less competitive industries. In a com-
petitive environment, firms are more pressured to invest in CSR as a strategic response
to external pressure from customers, employees, regulators, and the media. I sort firms
into terciles based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) index, which is a measure of market
concentration and competitiveness. Firms operating in the top HHI tercile are coded as firms
of the least competitive industries. I report our results in Table 9. As shown in Table 9, the
effect is strongest for the least competitive industries, but becomes weaker for the middle
tercile and turns positive for the most competitive industries. The results are consistent with
my prediction.
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5.3 Triple Interactions
In this subsection, I analyze the relationship in a triple-interaction setting. I create a
triple interaction term of CSR measure, governance and growth options. For completeness, I
include all single variables and double interaction terms and estimate the following model:
q = β0 + β1 ∗ governance+ β2 ∗ growth+ β3 ∗ csr
+ β4 ∗ governance ∗ growth+ β5 ∗ governance ∗ csr + β6 ∗ growth ∗ csr
+ β7 ∗ governance ∗ growth ∗ csr + 
I report the results of triple interaction analysis in Table 10. In table 10, I employ three
alternative measures of value and profitability: Tobin’s Q, industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q, and
ROA. The empirical evidence is striking. The negative coefficient on the double interaction
term between CSR and growth persists through all three models. This suggests that for
a firm with a governance score of 0, which is close to the average, the previous result of
CSR-firm value negative relation for growth firms withstands. The double interaction term
between CSR and governance is positive and significant, suggesting that for firms with growth
options of 0 (which is significantly lower than the average), the relationship between CSR
and Tobins Q turns positive for well-governed firms. This implies that governance helps to
alleviate the negative effects of CSR on firm value. In other words, well-governed firms are
able to make “smarter” or more productive CSR investments than their poorly-governed
counterparts. The triple interaction term between CSR, governance and growth is negative
and significant, with a coefficient of (-2.148) and t-stat of (-4.24) (model 1) even after
correcting for heteroskedasticity and clustering standard errors (White, 1980). The results
indicate that the CSR-firm value inverse relationship of growth firms is stronger if firms
are well-governed. This indicates that part of investors population revise their valuation
downwards when well-governed firms invest in CSR because investors are more convinced
that firms lack good growth options.
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CHAPTER 6
ADDITIONAL TESTS
6.1 Change to CSR
The regression results indicate that growth options explain the cross-sectional variations in
CSR because firms are subject to financial and attention constraints. In this section, I provide
non-regression tests to further strengthen the results. More specifically, I examine the changes
in capital expenditure, research and development (R&D) and annual buy-and-hold abnormal
returns (BHAR) for firms experiencing significant changes in their social responsibility. In
particular, I divide the sample into two groups: a treatment group and a control group. The
treatment group includes all firms experiencing significant changes to their CSR from one
year to the next, either positive or negative. A change is categorized as “significant” if it
is at least twice the average standard deviation of CSR across all firms in the sample. The
control group includes all firms which are not in the treatment group.
After identifying the treatment group experiencing either a significant increase or decrease,
we examine the before- and after- changes in R&D, capital expenditure and BHAR for the
year with the significant change. A change in R&D is calculated as the difference in the
capital expenditure scaled by total assets from year (t − 1) to year (t + 1) where t is the
year with a “significant” increase or decrease in firm social performance. Changes in capital
expenditure and buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) are calculated in a similar manner.
Mathematically, the calculations are presented as follows:
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∆XRD/ATt =
XRDi,t+1
ATi,t+1
− XRDi,t−1
ATi,t−1
∆CAPX/ATt =
CAPXi,t+1
ATi,t+1
− CAPXi,t−1
ATi,t−1
∆BHARt = BHARi,t+1 −BHARi,t−1
where BHAR is the buy-and-hold abnormal return similar to Ritter and Welch (2002),
among others. I calculate the twelve-month market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns
using the value-weighted CRSP index as the benchmark. The BHARs are calculated as
follows:
BHARi =
12∏
t=1
(1 + rit)−
12∏
t=1
(1 + rmt )
where BHARi is the twelve-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns for firm i. r
i
t is the raw
return for firm i in month t and rmt is the value-weighted market return in month t.
Table 11 reports the results of the average of the pre- and post-differences in R&D, capital
expenditure and buy-and-hold abnormal returns for firms undergoing significant changes in
their CSR.
Panel A shows the increase (decrease) in R&D expenditure, capital expenditure and
BHAR the year after relatively to the year prior to the change. Most significantly, investors
enjoy 5.07% increase in return following a significant reduction in CSR measures, and suffer
from a decrease of 6.45% after the firm experiences a big jump in CSR. I also observe a
0.369% reduction in R&D investments amongst firms which increased in CSR substantially.
Using the conservative composite CSR score as the measure of CSR, I find that firms which
swiftly increase in their CSR reduce their capital investments by 0.247% on average. Using
the conservative score, which excludes product dimension, is more appropriate in the analysis
because firms producing high quality and innovative products naturally have higher levels of
R&D and capital expenditure.
Panel B shows the before- and after- changes in R&D, capital expenditure and BHAR for
21
firms experiencing significant changes to their CSR components: community, environment,
employee, human rights, diversity and product. I identify firms experiencing significant
changes to each component score using the same methodology as employed in the composite
score (Panel A). For example, a firm is categorized as a positive-change firm in its community
score if the firm increases its community score by more than twice the average standard
deviation in corporate community score across all firms. The analyses in community and
environment areas lend credence to the argument that CSR and growth options are negatively
correlated. More specifically, I observe a significant decrease in R&D and capital expenditure
investment for firms significantly increased their community, environment and product
component scores. For firms significantly reduced their environment score, I find an increase
of 2.47% on capital expenditure. Because community, environment and products are the
most capital intensive CSR components, I expect to find the most supportive evidence in
these CSR dimensions. There is little evidence to support that firms becoming more socially
responsible in their employee’s relation, human rights and diversity, drastically reduce in
their investments in R&D and capital expenditure. The lack of evidence in these areas is
expected because the growth-CSR relation is stronger for capital-intensive CSR dimensions.
6.2 Score matching
In an alternative research design, I use propensity score matching method to compare the
differences in buy-and-hold abnormal returns between the treatment and control groups. For
each firm in the treatment group, I find good matches from the control group and compare
the average differences in the buy-and-hold abnormal returns. I employ three matching
methods: the nearest neighbor matching, the Gaussian kernel matching and the stratification
matching.
In the score matching technique, I save the predicted probabilities from the probit model
to use for the matching procedures. Firms in the treatment group and control group have
similar characteristics that I would like to control for: industry, size, growth options and cash
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holdings. I then examine the average treatment effects on the treated – that is, the average
difference in buy-and-hold abnormal returns between the treatment and the control groups.
In the nearest neighbor matching setup, for each treatment firm, a control firm which
has the closest propensity (based on industry, size, growth options and cash holdings) to the
treatment firm is selected. In the Gaussian kernel matching, for each treated observation,
several matches are selected and the weighted average treatment effects are sequentially
computed where the weights are determined by their distances to the treated observations.
In the stratification matching method, propensity scores are sorted into different blocks and
within each block, treatment and control firms are paired and the average treatment effects
are computed for all the pairs. The t-stats are based on one-hundred time bootstrapping. I
report the results in Table 12.
The results reported in Table 12 are astounding. I find that the firms which had significantly
reduced their CSR enjoyed significantly higher returns. The magnitude is economically large.
For instance, the stratification matching shows a difference of 7.12% in annual excess returns
for firms which experienced a drastic drop in their CSR. Other matching methods yield
results of similar magnitudes. In a stark contrast, I find that firms which had dramatically
improved their social performance earned significantly lower returns. The differences are
economically meaningful. For example, using the stratification matching method, I find that
firms experiencing a dramatic increase in CSR earned 4.98% lower return than control firms.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
The agency view posits that CSR is a mismanagement of corporate resources, and that
managers are tempted to invest in CSR for their personal benefits. In this paper, I propose that
growth opportunities can act as a self-regulated scheme in which managers are incentivized
to divert their away attention away from CSR to focus on growth. When firms have plenty
of profitable projects, managers are motivated to spend their time and resources on these
projects. When firms do not have good projects, managers are tempted to “do good with
other people’s money” for personal gains (Cheng, Hong, and Shue, 2013). Since well-governed
firms are more inclined to make corporate financial decisions which are consistent with the
shareholder maximization goal, I expect that the negative relationship between growth options
and CSR is more pronounced amongst firms with stronger governance mechanisms. I indeed
find this inverse relationship between growth and CSR to be stronger amongst well-governed
firms, financially-constrained firms, and capital-intensive projects.
In this paper, I do not claim any causal relationship between growth options and CSR. I
simply suggest that the attention shift is one channel via which growth options may undercut
CSR. I rely on the assumption that managers are time-constrained and attention-limited.
When given different projects which are not necessarily mutually exclusive, managers may
choose to divert from less productive projects to focus on projects that generate the most
personal benefits.
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Table 2: The relationship between growth options and CSR
This table shows the inverse relationship between growth options and CSR for various firms.
I use two popular measures of corporate governance: the GIM G-Index (Gompers, Ishii, and
Metrick (2003)) and the BCF entrenchment E-Index (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2008)).
The G-index and E-index are constructed such that the higher the score, the more effective
the governance. Detailed definitions and constructs of variables are provided in the Appendix
A. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance of the coefficient
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All regressions are controlled for firm and year
fixed effects.
Well-governed Middle Poorly-governed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
csr csr csr csr csr csr
capg1 -0.164** -0.258** -0.130 -0.0548 -0.0483 -0.0798
(-2.31) (-2.15) (-1.32) (-0.71) (-0.40) (-0.62)
N 2581 1572 2145 3399 2489 1644
G Measure G index E index G index E index G index E index
R-squared 0.7679 0.7993 0.8388 0.813 0.814 0.8289
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3: Growth options and CSR for well-governed firms
This table shows the inverse relationship between growth options and CSR for well-governed
firms. I use three different measures of corporate governance: the MSCI CG, the GIM
G-Index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003)) and the BCF entrenchment E-Index (Bebchuk,
Cohen, and Ferrell (2008)). The G-index and E-index are constructed such that the higher
the score, the more effective the governance. Detailed definitions and constructs of variables
are provided in the Appendix A. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate
significance of the coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All regressions are
controlled for firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity
and clustered at firm-level (White (1980)).
MSCI CG BCF E-Index GIM G-index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
csr adj csr csr adj csr csr adj csr
cg 0.0923*** 0.0534*** 0.0437** 0.0137*** 0.0025 0.00179
(12.01) (9.11) (2.47) (2.70) (0.47) (1.09)
capg1 0.000848 0.000237 -0.408** -0.102* -0.382** -0.132***
(0.87) (1.08) (-2.08) (-1.91) (-2.56) (-2.84)
cg ∗ capg1 -0.0479* -0.0435* -0.129* -0.0358* -0.0318* -0.0128**
(-1.69) (-1.78) (-1.76) (-1.82) (-1.81) (-2.36)
cash 0.0555** 0.0136* -8.7E-05 0.00199 0.0038 0.0059
(2.06) (1.84) (-0.00) (0.12) (0.09) (0.46)
N 23539 23539 6750 6750 7383 7383
G measure cg adj cg E index E index G index G index
R-squared 0.6606 0.6351 0.7946 0.7575 0.7942 0.7506
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Firm Firm Firm Firm None None
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Table 4: External governance: analyst following
This table shows the relationship between growth options and CSR for firms with different
external governance, proxied by the number of analysts following. Every year, I sort
log(number of analysts following) into tercile and the top tercile is coded as the highest
external governance. I use two different measures of internal corporate governance: the
MSCI CG and the BCF E-Index (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2008)). Detailed definitions
and constructs of variables are provided in the Appendix A. T-statistics are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance of the coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively. All regressions are controlled for firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at firm-level (White (1980)).
Highest analyst Middle Lowest analyst
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
csr csr csr csr csr csr
cg 0.114*** 0.0442 0.0534*** 0.0806*** 0.0272*** 0.0435
(7.73) (1.43) (3.71) (3.35) (2.85) (1.55)
capg1 0.021 -0.626* 0.0434 -0.284 0.000316 -0.518*
(0.28) (-1.91) (1.44) (-1.12) (1.31) (-1.72)
cg ∗ capg1 -0.152** -0.216* -0.0498 -0.123 -0.0178 -0.108
(-1.99) (-1.80) (-0.93) (-1.25) (-0.60) (-1.06)
cash 0.043 -0.108 0.041 0.00547 0.0476 0.139
(0.67) (-0.99) (1.17) (0.06) (1.32) (1.47)
N 7580 2680 6961 1904 6186 1340
G measure cg E − index cg E − index cg E − index
R-squared 0.7229 0.805 0.7193 0.8691 0.7195 0.864
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
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Table 5: Financial constrained vs. non-constrained firms
This table shows the effects of growth options on social performance for financially-constrained
and non-constrained firms. Firms in the top tercile sorted based on their previous year’s
financial constraint Kaplan-Zingales (Kaplan and Zingales (1995)) scores are coded as
constrained firms. Detailed definitions and constructs of variables are provided in the
Appendix A. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance of the
coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All regressions are controlled for firm
and year fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at
firm-level (White (1980)).
Dependent Variable
Constrained firms Non-constrained firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
csr adj csr csr adj csr
capg1 0.131 0.00164 0.000668 0.000339
(1.34) (0.06) (0.83) (1.4)
cg 0.0937*** 0.0655*** 0.0940*** 0.0517***
(5.74) (5.66) (10.63) (7.69)
cg ∗ capg1 -0.168* -0.127* -0.0449 -0.0393
(-1.83) (-1.88) (-1.35) (-1.39)
N 4713 4713 18218 18218
G measure cg adj cg cg adj cg
R-squared 0.6421 0.6243 0.6818 0.6551
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Firm Firm Firm Firm
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Table 6: Capital-intensive vs. non-capital-intensive CSR components
This table shows the effects of growth options on performance in capital intensive and non-capital-intensive
subareas of CSR. The six areas are: community (com), environment(env), employee relations (emp), human
rights (hum), diversity (div) and product (pro). Detailed definitions and constructs of variables are provided
in the Appendix A. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance of the coefficient
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All regressions are controlled for firm and year fixed effects.
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at firm-level (White, 1980).
a. Panel A shows the effects of growth options on different CSR components, using the MSCI CG index as a
measure of corporate governance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
com env emp hum div pro
cg 0.0754*** 0.209*** 0.0722*** 0.0338*** 0.113*** 0.0524***
(6.84) (10.84) (3.88) (4.26) (5.66) (4.01)
capg1 -0.00274 0.00324 0.000416 0.00116 0.000574 0.00203
(-1.04) (1.09) (0.2) (0.87) (0.25) (0.78)
cg ∗ capg1 -0.0063 -0.146** -0.0939 0.00183 -0.0124 -0.0382
(-0.19) (-2.37) (-1.50) (0.07) (-0.14) (-0.88)
cash 0.0595 0.186*** -0.108 0.0418** 0.128 0.0372
(1.62) (3.59) (-1.32) (2.21) (1.53) (0.91)
N 23539 23539 23539 22316 23539 23539
R-squared 0.5785 0.5715 0.5144 0.4279 0.7307 0.6229
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
b. Panel B shows the effects of growth options on different CSR components, using the BCF entrenchment
index (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2008)) as an alternative measure of governance.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
com env emp hum div pro
e index 0.042 0.0707** 0.0682 0.00364 0.103* -0.0369
(1.35) (2.02) (1.44) (0.23) (1.93) (-1.13)
capg1 -0.476 -0.720*** -0.637 -0.0452 -0.828 0.246
(-1.44) (-3.08) (-1.50) (-0.32) (-1.49) (0.91)
e ∗ capg1 -0.0823 -0.243** -0.223 -0.0093 -0.219 0.0336
(-0.64) (-2.50) (-1.39) (-0.18) (-1.07) -(0.31)
cash -0.0532 0.201** -0.239 -0.0311 -0.00448 0.191*
(-0.67) (2.03) (-1.41) (-0.64) (-0.02) (1.74)
N 6750 6750 6750 5739 6750 6750
R-squared 0.7317 0.7882 0.6808 0.6673 0.7847 0.7809
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
30
Table 7: Value implications of CSR for firms with growth options
This table studies the effects of CSR on firm value (proxied by Tobin’s Q) with respect to
different firm growth options. Tobin’s Q is measured as (book value of assets + market value
of equity - book value of equity deferred taxes investment tax credit + redemption value of
preferred stock)/book value of assets. Alternatively, I use industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q based
on Fama-French 49 industry classifications. Detailed definitions and constructs of variables
are provided in the Appendix A. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate
significance of the coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All regressions are
controlled for firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity
and clustered at firm level (White, 1980).
Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
q adj q q adj q
csr 0.0555 0.0760*** 0.262 0.268***
(1.03) (2.63) (1.43) (2.69)
capg1 0.646*** 0.430*** 0.432*** 0.295***
(4.11) (5.00) (3.84) (4.73)
csr ∗ capg1 -1.264*** -0.842*** -4.311*** -2.952***
(-4.01) (-4.89) (-3.71) (-4.58)
cash 1.737*** 0.821*** 1.739*** 0.824***
(8.35) (7.20) (8.35) (7.23)
N 21473 21306 21473 21306
CSR measure csr csr adj csr adj csr
R-squared 0.7084 0.7124 0.7081 0.7121
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Firm Firm Firm Firm
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Table 8: Value implications of CSR for well-governed firms
This table shows the regression results of CSR on firm value for well-governed firms. Tobin’s
Q is measured as (book value of assets + market value of equity - book value of equity
deferred taxes investment tax credit + redemption value of preferred stock)/book value of
assets. Alternatively, I use industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q based on Fama-French 49 industry
classifications. Detailed definitions and constructs of variables are provided in the Appendix
A. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance of the coefficient
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity
and clustered at firm level (White, 1980).
Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
q adj q q adj q
csr -0.268* -0.0943 -0.340*** -0.140**
(-1.89) (-1.22) (-2.75) (-2.06)
cg 0.0242 0.0199 0.0269 0.023
(0.56) (0.85) (0.62) (0.98)
csr ∗ cg -1.038*** -0.582*** -1.153*** -0.579***
(-3.58) (-3.50) (-3.84) (-3.73)
cash 1.719*** 0.827*** 1.718*** 0.826***
(8.40) (7.34) (8.40) (7.34)
N 23069 22792 23069 22792
G measure adj cg adj cg adj cg adj cg
CSR measure adj csr adj csr adj csr2 adj csr2
R-squared 0.71 0.7112 0.7102 0.7113
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Firm Firm Firm Firm
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Table 9: Competitiveness of industries
This table shows the effects of CSR on firm value for well-governed firms across industries
of different competitiveness. Competitiveness is measured based on Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index(HHI). HHI is sorted into terciles and the top tercile is coded as the least competitive
industries. Tobin’s Q is measured as (book value of assets + market value of equity - book value
of equity deferred taxes investment tax credit + redemption value of preferred stock)/book
value of assets. Alternatively, I use industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q based on Fama-French 49
industry classifications. Detailed definitions and constructs of variables are provided in the
Appendix A. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance of
the coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered at firm level (White, 1980).
Least competitive Middle Most competitive
(1) (2) (3)
adj q adj q adj q
csr -0.209 -0.132 0.159
(-1.44) (-1.37) (1.26)
cg -0.00258 0.0201 0.0505
(-0.06) (0.54) (1.37)
csr ∗ cg -0.581** -0.309 0.0354
(-2.17) (-1.36) (0.10)
cash 1.046*** 0.599*** 0.951***
(6.23) (4.14) (4.48)
N 8018 7991 5927
G measure adj cg adj cg adj cg
CSR measure adj csr adj csr adj csr
R-squared 0.7576 0.7135 0.7947
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Firm Firm Firm
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Table 10: Triple interactions: Value implications of CSR
This table studies the effect of CSR investment, governance and growth options on firm value.
I created double and triple interaction terms from the three variables. Detailed definitions
and constructs of variables are provided in the Appendix A. T-statistics are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance of the coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively. All regressions are controlled for firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at firm level (White (1980)).
Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3)
q adj q roa
csr 0.074 0.0873*** 0.0137**
(1.42) (3.09) (2.27)
cg 0.0109 0.00075 0.000711
(0.47) (0.06) (0.21)
capg1 0.859*** 0.555*** 0.0817***
(5.81) (6.85) (3.26)
cash 1.731*** 0.817*** 0.132***
(8.34) (7.16) (3.44)
csr ∗ cg 0.176*** 0.0873*** 0.0139*
(3.27) (2.97) (1.89)
csr ∗ capg1 -1.697*** -1.095*** -0.160***
(-5.74) (-6.76) (-3.22)
cg ∗ capg1 0.192 0.163 0.0116
(1.06) (1.61) (0.40)
csr ∗ cg ∗ capg1 -2.148*** -1.118*** -0.127*
(-4.24) (-3.93) (-1.78)
N 21473 21306 23539
R-squared 0.7094 0.7135 0.5185
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Firm Firm Firm
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Table 11: Response to significant changes in CSR
This table shows the pre- and post- differences in firm R&D expenditure, capital expenditure, and
buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for firms experiencing significant changes in CSR. Changes that are
at least twice the average standard deviation of CSR across all firms are coded as “significant”. A positive
(negative) change indicates a significant increase (decrease) in CSR. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate significance of the coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
A. Panel A shows the changes in firm R&D expenditure, capital expenditure (scaled by total assets) and
annual excess returns from the year before to the year after the year which firms undergo “significant”
changes.
Positive change Negative change
XRD/TA CAPX/TA BHAR XRD/TA CAPX/TA BHAR
csr
-0.00369** -0.00165 -0.0758*** -0.00201 -0.00132 0.0649
(-2.28) (-1.23) (-2.95) (-1.48) (-0.71) (1.65)
N= 245 N=408 N=407 N=118 N=206 N=205
csr2
-0.00171 -0.00247 ** -0.0645*** -0.00417 -0.0007 0.0507*
(-1.13) (-2.03) (-3.22) (-1.21) (-0.45) (1.82)
N=388 N=670 N=671 N=250 N=436 N=438
B. Panel B shows the pre- and post- changes in firm R&D expenditure, capital expenditure (scaled by total
assets) and annual excess returns for firms experiencing significant changes to their CSR components. For
example, “significant” change in community score is defined as a change which is at least twice the average
standard deviation of community scores across all firms. Changes in other CSR components are defined in a
similar fashion.
Positive change Negative change
XRD/TA CAPX/TA BHAR XRD/TA CAPX/TA BHAR
Community (COM)
-0.00222** -0.00427*** -0.0569*** -0.00151 -0.00011 0.00796
(-2.34) (-3.97) (-3.07) (-1.46) (-0.11) (0.42)
N=359 N=794 N=834 N=320 N=691 N=723
Environment (ENV)
-0.00115 -0.00395*** 0.0163 0.000262 0.00247** -0.0392**
(-1.58) (-4.09) (1.14) (0.37) (2.31) (-2.19)
N=813 N=1378 N=1377 N=537 N=1009 N=1008
Employee (EMP)
-0.0027 -0.00104 -0.0008 -0.00151 -0.00522*** 0.0234
(-1.52) (-0.84) (-0.04) (-0.60) (-2.92) (0.67)
N=371 N=659 N=655 N=141 N=256 N=261
Human rights (HUM)
-0.00249* -0.00276 -0.2212*** -0.0004 -0.00386* 0.0381
(-1.84) (-1.37) (-6.62) (-0.31) (-1.96) (1.13)
N=186 N=326 N=328 N=139 N=204 N=204
Diversity (DIV)
0.00355 0.00299** -0.0764*** -0.00840*** -0.00539*** 0.0616**
(1.06) (2.51) (-3.04) (-2.63) (-4.10) (2.55)
N=342 N=651 N=640 N=390 N=693 N=691
Product (PRO)
-0.0012 -0.00264*** -0.0483** -0.00164 -0.00198** 0.0317**
(-1.07) (-3.33) (-2.19) (-1.21) (-2.40) (2.10)
N=545 N=1078 N=1085 N=504 N=996 N=1015
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APPENDIX A
VARIABLES
Variable Label Definition/Construction
q Tobin’s Q (book value of assets + market value of equity -
book value of equity deferred taxes investment tax
credit + redemption value of preferred stock)/book
value of assets.
Source: Compustat
adj q Industry-adjusted Q Firm Tobin’s Q/industry median Tobin’s Q (based
on the Fama-French 49 industry classification).
Source: Compustat
csr CSR composite score The average of (strength scores - concern scores)
across six categories: community, diversity, em-
ployee, environment, human rights, and product.
Source: MSCI ESG (formerly KLD)
adj csr Trend-adjusted CSR
composite score
The average of adjusted component scores across
six categories: community, diversity, employee,
environment, human rights, and product.
Source: MSCI ESG (formerly KLD)
csr2 Conservative CSR
score (exclude prod-
uct)
The average of (strength scores - concern scores)
across five categories: community, diversity, em-
ployee, environment, and human rights (exclude
product).
Source: MSCI ESG (formerly KLD)
adj csr2 Trend- adjusted con-
servative CSR score
(exclude product)
The average of adjusted component scores across
five categories: community, diversity, employee,
environment, and human rights (exclude product).
Source: MSCI ESG (formerly KLD)
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cg Corporate gover-
nance score
(Corporate governance strength score - corporate
governance concern score)
Corporate governance ratings are given based on
the assessment of firm performance on the fol-
lowing areas: compensation, ownership structure,
accounting transparency, political accountability,
public policy, controversial investments and busi-
ness ethics.
Source: MSCI ESG (formerly KLD)
adj cg Trend-adjusted cor-
porate governance
score
(Corporate governance strength score/ maximum
corporate governance strength score) - (Corporate
governance concern score/maximum corporate gov-
ernance concern score)
Source: MSCI ESG (formerly KLD)
G− index Alternative corporate
governance measure
Governance G-index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick,
2003)
E − index Alternative corporate
governance measure
Entrenchment E-Index (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Fer-
rell, 2008)
capg1 Growth option mea-
sure
proxied by capital expenditure growth and mea-
sured as capital expenditure divided by fixed assets
(capx/ppegt)
Source: Compustat
capg2 Alternative growth
option measure
proxied by capital expenditure growth and mea-
sured as changes in capital expenditure divided by
lagged assets (capx-lag capx)/lag at
Source: Compustat
roa Performance measure Net income/Total Asset (ni/at)
Source: Compustat
size Firm size The natural logarithm of the prior year’s total
asset (log(lag at))
Source: Compustat
lag kz Capital Constraint
Kaplan-Zingales
Index (Kaplan and
Zingales (1995))
KZ=-1.001909*((ib+dp)/lag ppent)+
0.2826389*((at+(prcc f*csho)-ceq-
txdb)/at)+3.139193*((dltt+dlc)/(dltt+dlc
+seq))-39.3678*((dvc+dvp)/lag ppent)-
1.314759*(che/lag ppent)
Source: Compustat
cash Cash holdings Cash= cash +marketable securities scaled by as-
sets (che/at)
Source: Compustat
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hhi Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index
hhi is calculated by adding up the squared the
market share of each firm
hhi = s21 +s
2
2 +s
2
3 + ... where si is the market share
of firm i
Source: Compustat
analyst External governance
measure
Analyst= Log(number of analysts following in the
year)
Source: I/B/E/S
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APPENDIX B
MATH PROOFS
For tractability of the math, I solve for the two extreme cases of governance (ω): ω= 0
and ω=1.
Proof. (Proposition 1)
• Case 1: ω=0 (bad governance):
The firm utility is given by
U(R, V ) = Um(R, V ) = R
αV β
The manager’s optimization problem:
maximize (ACSR)
φα(AGrowth)
θβ
subject to ACSR + AGrowth = A
⇐⇒ maximize (ACSR)φα(A− ACSR)θβ
The first order condition needs to be satisfied. That is:
(φα)(ACSR)
(φα−1)(A− ACSR)θβ − (ACSR)φα(θβ)(A− ACSR)(θβ−1) = 0 (B.1)
Multiply both sides with 1
(ACSR)φα
1
(A−ACSR)θβ
(C.1) ⇐⇒ (φα)
(ACSR)
− (θβ)
(A− ACSR) = 0
⇐⇒ (φα)(A− ACSR) = (θβ)(ACSR)
⇐⇒ (φα)A = (θβ + φα)(ACSR)
or ACSR =
(
φα
φα+θβ
)
A
AGrowth = A
[
1−
(
φα
φα+θβ
)]
=
(
θβ
φα+θβ
)
A
Thus,
R = (ACSR)
φ =
[(
φα
φα + θβ
)
A
]φ
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⇒ ∂R
∂θ
= −[(φα)A]φφ(φα + θβ)φ−1β < 0 (B.2)
• Case 2: ω=1 (good governance): The firm utility is given by
U(R, V ) = Us(R, V ) = R
αV λ
The manager’s optimization problem:
maximize (ACSR)
φα(AGrowth)
θλ
subject to ACSR + AGrowth = A
⇐⇒ maximize (ACSR)φα(A− ACSR)θλ
The first order condition needs to be satisfied. That is:
(φα)(ACSR)
(φα−1)(A− ACSR)θλ − (ACSR)φα(θλ)(A− ACSR)(θλ−1) = 0 (B.3)
Multiply both sides with 1
(ACSR)φα
1
(A−ACSR)θλ
(C.2) ⇐⇒ (φα)
(ACSR)
− (θλ)
(A− ACSR) = 0
⇐⇒ (φα)(A− ACSR) = (θλ)(ACSR)
⇐⇒ (φα)A = (θλ+ φα)(ACSR)
or ACSR =
(
φα
φα+θλ
)
A
AGrowth = A
[
1−
(
φα
φα+θλ
)]
=
(
θλ
φα+θλ
)
A
Thus,
R = (ACSR)
φ =
[(
φα
φα + θλ
)
A
]φ
⇒ ∂R
∂θ
= −[(φα)A]φφ(φα + θλ)φ−1λ < 0 (B.4)
(C.2) and (C.4) complete the proof of Proposition 1 1.
Proof. (Proposition 2)
From the proof of Proposition 1:{
From (C.2) : ∂R
∂θ
= −[(φα)A]φφ(φα + θβ)φ−1β < 0 (ω = 0)
From (C.4) : ∂R
∂θ
= −[(φα)A]φφ(φα + θλ)φ−1λ < 0 (ω = 1)
1Because λ > β, φ ∈ [0, 1]→ Rω=0 > Rω=1
43
Because λ > β, φ ∈ [0, 1], we get ∂2R
∂θ∂ω
> 0. This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
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APPENDIX C
ADDITIONAL ROBUST RESULTS
Table C1: Robustness test: Value implications of CSR for growth firms
This table studies the effect of CSR on firm value with respect to different firm growth
options using an alternative measure of growth options. Growth option is measured as
changes in capital expenditure scaled by lagged assets. Tobin’s Q is measured as (book
value of assets + market value of equity - book value of equity deferred taxes investment
tax credit + redemption value of preferred stock)/book value of assets. Alternatively, I use
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q based on Fama-French 49 industry classifications. Detailed
definitions and constructs of variables are provided in the Appendix A. T-statistics are
reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance of the coefficient at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels, respectively. All regressions are controlled for firm and year fixed effects.
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at firm level (White, 1980).
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
adj q adj q adj q adj q
csr -0.00806 -0.0318 -0.0234 -0.0828
(-0.34) (-0.41) (-1.12) (-1.21)
capg2 0.0585 0.0449 0.0583 0.0422
(1.10) (1.06) (1.11) (1.06)
csr ∗ capg2 -0.479* -3.296*** -0.442* -3.218***
(-1.65) (-3.74) (-1.74) (-4.26)
cash 0.825*** 0.823*** 0.826*** 0.824***
(7.27) (7.26) (7.29) (7.27)
N 22592 22592 22592 22592
CSR measure csr adj csr csr2 adj csr2
R-squared 0.7116 0.7118 0.7116 0.7119
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Firm Firm Firm Firm
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Table C2: Value implications of CSR for growth firms: Operating performance
This table studies the effect of CSR investment, and growth options firm operating
performance, proxied by roa. Detailed definitions and constructs of variables are provided in
the Appendix A. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance of
the coefficient at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. All regressions are controlled for
firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at
firm level (White, 1980).
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
roa roa roa roa
csr 0.0121* 0.0422 0.00966 0.0343
(1.68) (1.56) (1.53) (1.41)
capg1 0.0694** 0.0489** 0.0701** 0.0507**
(2.13) (2.16) (2.06) (2.12)
csr ∗ capg1 -0.135** -0.489** -0.114** -0.423**
(-2.08) (-2.09) (-2.01) (-2.05)
cash 0.132*** 0.133*** 0.133*** 0.133***
(3.48) (3.48) (3.48) (3.49)
N 23539 23539 23539 23539
CSR mesaure csr adj csr csr2 adj csr2
R-squared 0.5182 0.518 0.5182 0.5181
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering Firm Firm Firm Firm
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